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Original article: Jorge Magasich: «La decisión de impulsar el golpe se tomó antes de que Allende asumiera la Presidencia»

Historian Jorge Magasich reflected on the origins of the Popular Unity, the U.S. intervention prior to Salvador Allende’s arrival at La Moneda, and the key milestones of the first year of Allende’s government that initiated political polarization.

In a new episode of the show hosted by Javier Pineda, guest Jorge Magasich Airola, a PhD in History from the Free University of Brussels and a researcher specialized in the history of Popular Unity, discussed his insights drawn from a series of books, including four already published and two more in preparation.

During the discussion, Magasich reviewed the emergence of the Popular Unity and the factors that contributed to its electoral victory. He also analyzed the period between the election of Salvador Allende and his inauguration, the significant events of his first year in office, and the evolution of the Chilean political landscape, transitioning from the three-thirds logic—Popular Unity, Christian Democracy and National Party—to a growing polarization between Popular Unity and the sectors that precipitated the coup d’état.

The Rise of Popular Unity and Allende’s Electoral Victory

In this segment, the origins of Popular Unity were explored, as Magasich argued that the 1958 presidential election marked a turning point in Chilean politics. He suggests that the narrow results achieved by Salvador Allende raised alarms in both conservative sectors of the country and in the United States regarding the potential for the left to gain power in future elections.

The historian explained that the response was to bolster the Christian Democracy as a reformist alternative capable of attracting popular sectors without breaking with the capitalist model. He pointed to the Italian post-war experience as a model, where Christian Democracy, supported by the United States, maintained power against a strong Communist Party.

He also recalled how the Chilean Christian Democracy emerged in the 1950s through the unification of the National Falange with conservative social Christian and Ibañista sectors, a process that coincided with a growing interest from the Church and the United States to consolidate a political force to contain the left’s advance, especially after the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

According to the researcher, Allende’s victory in 1970 resulted, among other factors, from the convergence of two political and social phenomena. On one hand, the Christian Democrats presented the candidacy of Radomiro Tomic with a program that, at least in its outlines and rhetoric, proposed progressive reforms, although—as various researchers cited by Magasich suggest—this was constrained by multiple limitations that restricted its transformative reach. On the other hand, the Radical Party experienced a shift to the left that culminated in its incorporation into Popular Unity, contributing votes that were crucial in a closely contested election.

The researcher noted that this occurred alongside the emergence of numerous social movements in the second half of the 1960s. «The labor movement strengthened, strikes increased in duration, and broader unions began forming, comprising both workers and employees,» he stated.

Additionally, there was a strong movement of low-income populations, the creation of agricultural labor unions, and movements advocating for accelerated agrarian reform. These processes were joined by movements for women’s emancipation, university reform, and a significant cultural movement represented by the Nueva Canción Chilena and early filmmakers attempting to depict national reality.

U.S. Intervention Prior to Allende’s Inauguration

Following the themes in his writings, Magasich noted that the second volume largely draws on declassified documents and period press.

«We all knew that the United States had intervened in Chilean politics, but after reviewing that documentation, I realized the magnitude was much greater than I had imagined,» he stated.

According to the historian, U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry acted as «practically a viceroy,» to the extent that Eduardo Frei’s government did not make significant decisions without consulting him first.

Moreover, he explained that during the 1970 presidential campaign, the CIA promoted a campaign of terror against Allende. Although he specified that it did not directly fund any candidate, it concentrated its efforts on disseminating anti-communist propaganda, which ultimately had limited impact.

Furthermore, the researcher indicated that after Allende’s victory, Washington’s priority shifted to promoting a coup d’état, with Agustín Edwards being one of the first proponents of that idea. He explained how the owner of El Mercurio met with the U.S. ambassador and later with the CIA director and even President Richard Nixon.

Additionally, there was a meeting requested by Frei on September 12, 1970, with a representative of the U.S. government, during which—according to the researcher—he asked to convey to Nixon that Chile had «98 chances out of 100» of becoming a new Cuba. Magasich believes that this was a signal to prompt intervention, and three days later, on September 15, Nixon ordered the organization of a coup, even before Allende took office.

On another note, he also addressed the assassination attempt against Army Chief of Staff René Schneider, stating that while it was officially presented as an attempt at kidnapping, testimonies indicate that the attackers opened fire from the get-go, and the operation involved high-ranking military and police officials linked to the coup.

Magasich argued that the CIA initially viewed the operation as successful and anticipated it would lead to a coup. However, widespread public rejection of Schneider’s assassination thwarted these plans and allowed Allende to assume the presidency. He added that while Ambassador Edward Korry warned that a coup would fail without support from Frei or the Army Chief of Staff, Henry Kissinger persistently insisted on promoting it.

In terms of the institutional landscape, Magasich highlighted that during the 60 days leading up to Allende’s inauguration, an agreement was reached between the DC and Popular Unity through the Statute of Constitutional Guarantees. He also noted that the Supreme Court, the Comptroller’s Office, and parts of the press took on a political role during this period.

Moreover, the interviewee claimed that there were various attempts to assassinate Allende even before he took office at La Moneda. Among them was one reported by Air Force Captain Jorge Silva, who warned of a plan to kill the elected president during a visit to Valparaíso. After failing to inform his superiors, he went directly to Allende’s command, who decided to publicly denounce the threat, thwarting the assassination attempt that, according to the historian, was to be led by Arturo Marshall.

The Initial Reforms and the Outset of Political Confrontation

Regarding the first year of Popular Unity, Magasich emphasized that one of the first actions was the pardon of around 50 leftist militants who had remained imprisoned or underground due to political crimes or actions linked to the MIR.

Among the key economic policies, he highlighted the increase in the purchasing power of popular sectors through salary adjustments exceeding inflation, allowing for improved consumption of basic goods. He also noted symbolic measures, such as instructions to Carabineros not to shoot unless under risk of life, capping state income at 20 minimum wages, and using more modest vehicles by the Presidency.

Furthermore, he highlighted the «half-liter of milk» program that helped reduce infant mortality and the establishment of Quimantú, a state publisher that democratized access to reading through low-cost, high-quantity books.

On the economic front, he explained that the social aspect of the economy began to take shape through stock purchases by CORFO and the Central Bank, as well as state intervention in companies. Meanwhile, banks were nationalized to expand access to credit as pressures from workers mounted for greater nationalization.

Moreover, regarding copper nationalization, the investigator indicated that the initiative was drafted by Eduardo Novoa Monreal and was submitted at the end of 1970. Magasich stated that to obtain the support of the DC, it was necessary to incorporate the mixed companies created during the copper nationalization, which implied that the state took on a debt of around 700 million dollars. He also noted that the project contemplated deducting «excessive profits» obtained by the companies from the compensations.

The reform was unanimously approved on July 11, 1971, by the present parliamentarians. He recalled that all 158 legislators who participated in the vote supported the initiative, including the National Party.

The historian also discussed the fracture within the Christian Democracy, stemming from differences between supporters of Radomiro Tomic and those advocating the «own path» promoted by Patricio Aylwin. From this division arose the MAPU and later the Christian Left, both of which were incorporated into Popular Unity.

Simultaneously, Magasich noted that opposition began to organize more systematically from 1971. According to declassified documents, the CIA restructured its network in Chile, entrepreneurs gathered at the O’Higgins Hotel to plan an offensive against the government, and U.S. financing increased toward sectors linked to Frei.

He also stated that from September of that year, the country entered a phase of open confrontation, marked by the emergence of the Civic Front, the first «pot marches»—inspired by Brazil—and the consolidation of an opposition bloc alongside the National Party and business organizations.

Regarding the MIR, he pointed out that the organization made the mistake of not actively participating in the presidential campaign, believing Allende’s victory improbable, but correctly warned of the impending coup risk. In this context, it collaborated with the presidential escort—the future GAP—and helped thwart the plot against René Schneider by publicly alerting that a significant action was being planned.

During the first year of the government, he added, the MIR maintained a critical support for Popular Unity and promoted agricultural and Mapuche mobilizations, especially in the south of the country. Allende responded by temporarily relocating the Ministry of Agriculture to Temuco to accelerate agrarian reform and address the historical territorial conflict.

Finally, the historian hinted that future volumes of his research will delve deeper into the events of 1972, including the truck drivers’ strike, coup attempts, the rising political polarization, and the development of the Cybersyn project.

You can listen to the full interview with Jorge Magasich on PodCastpitalismo:

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La entrada Jorge Magasich: «The Decision to Support the Coup Was Made Before Allende Took Office» se publicó primero en El Ciudadano.