El Ciudadano
Original article: Las razones del triunfo de la ultraderecha alemana (AfD) en Sajonia-Anhalt
Leopoldo Lavín Mujica
The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured a significant victory in Saxony-Anhalt on September 6, garnering around 44% of the votes, illustrating a deep-rooted crisis within the German political system.
The collapse of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which has plummeted to nearly 18%, highlights the exhaustion of traditional right-wing politics against a far-right movement that has successfully harnessed societal discontent.
Another crucial factor cannot be overlooked: the failure of European social democracies to implement substantial changes that would significantly improve the lives of the majority. When progressive politics fail to provide a vision for the future, the ensuing discontent becomes fodder for their adversaries.
Germany is grappling with economic and social issues that have eroded trust in its institutions: slow growth, industrial challenges, household pressures, housing crises, infrastructure decline, and a growing sense of insecurity.
Additionally, the war in Ukraine has prompted the Scholz and Merz administrations to adopt a distinctly pro-Ukraine stance, calling for confrontation with Russia and a substantial increase in military spending.
For some populations, the question arises: how can the government justify such high spending on defense and support for Ukraine amidst pressing social needs within Germany?
The AfD has effectively turned this serious issue into electoral ammunition. While the German establishment maintains that supporting Ukraine and enhancing European defense is crucial in the face of Vladimir Putin, the far-right proposes the opposite: lifting sanctions, restoring relations with Moscow, reestablishing energy ties with Russia, and halting military aid to Kyiv.
Thus, the war becomes a symbol of elite failure, even as the AfD capitalizes on this discontent to simultaneously push its nationalist, anti-immigration, anti-European, and socially ultra-conservative agendas.
However, reducing this phenomenon solely to the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war would be a mistake. The AfD thrives on deeper discontent: wages, housing, insecurity, industrial transformation, climate policies, and a diminishing outlook for the future. This malaise persists because, for years, center-left forces have managed the system without sufficiently reforming its structures.
European social democracy has too often acquiesced to the limits imposed by neoliberalism, ultimately speaking the language of management when their constituents demanded redistribution, social protection, and empowerment of labor. The vacuum left by this abandonment is being filled by the far-right.
Saxony-Anhalt thus reveals a significant political incapacity: democratic forces can construct a Brandmauer (a containment barrier) against the AfD —and against fascist demons— but they cannot build a wall against the social causes of discontent.
If traditional parties merely claim that far-right movements are dangerous without offering solutions or a convincing project for those who feel they have lost material security and future prospects, the democratic warning loses its potency.
The left must understand that combating xenophobia also requires addressing the social conditions that allow immigrants to be scapegoated. Furthermore, right-wing parties and corporate oligarchies may feel tempted to align with far-right forces in the name of greater order, security, and guarantees for capital, reminiscent of Nazi Germany in 1932.
The German upheaval will have European repercussions. France stands out as one of the next major battlegrounds, with Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella vying for the presidency and a radical right exploiting economic resentment, immigration, and a disdain for elites.
As nationalist and xenophobic parties advance in other European nations, the AfD’s victory provides them with a powerful argument: even in Germany, a country historically marked by its rejection of fascism, the far-right can approach a majority.
This phenomenon also has an international dimension. Elon Musk has openly supported the AfD and used his platform to amplify its positions; Peter Thiel is part of the intellectual and financial ecosystem of the new American right. This circulation of money, technology, digital networks, and ideas demonstrates that far-right movements no longer act as isolated national phenomena; they share strategies, enemies, and political repertoires.
In response, the growing agitation from European lefts is insufficient. They must reconstruct a majority policy that unites unequivocal defense of democracy with social equality, decent wages, public services, and economic security.
The key takeaway from Saxony-Anhalt, therefore, is twofold. The Brandmauer remains essential to prevent an authoritarian and xenophobic force from transforming its electoral success into institutional power; yet it cannot substitute a transformative political agenda.
The responsibility for the rise of the far-right does not solely belong to those who vote for it: it also addresses politically elite groups incapable of responding to the social crisis and social democracies that prematurely abandoned their ambition to change the living conditions of the majority.
The far-right flourishes where fear finds a void of hope; and Europe cannot fill that void solely with anti-fascist containment measures, but rather with social democracy.
Leopoldo Lavín Mujica
Featured Photo: John MacDougall / AFP
La entrada Understanding the Rise of Germany’s Far-Right AfD in Saxony-Anhalt se publicó primero en El Ciudadano.
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